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OBSERVATIONS ON SOME PUTATIVE BENEFITS OF
STUDYING COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW
Mark Tushne
Borrowing has rightfully been called "one of the grand old topics
of comparative law."  In the United States, however, there is far more
interest in exporting  or lending  than there is in borrowing. The upsurge
of interest  in  comparative  constitutional  law  among  U.S.  constitu-
tional scholars may be the result of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
and the rapid and widespread  transformation  of non-democratic  re-
gimes  into  proto-democratic  or  democratic  nation-states.  A  by-
product of the rapidity with which the change occurred  was the pro-
liferation of efforts  by U.S.  constitutionalists  to instruct  people  else-
where on what a well-designed  constitution should look like.-  But, if
U.S.  constitutionalists were happy to  go along with  efforts  to ex-port
U.S.  constitutionalism,  they have been  less enthusiastic about  import-
ing constitutional  ideas from others!  Expanding  on the  metaphors
of  borrowing and  lending, U.S.  constitutional  scholars  might  expect
that their loans would be returned with interest, in the forms of new
constitutional  arrangements  that could provide additional benefits  to
the U.S.  constitutional system.  The U.S.  Supreme Court noted tvice
at the end of the  1996 Term  that other apparently well-functioning
constitutional systems do things differently from the U.S.  system, only
to dismiss those experiences as irrelevant to U.S.  constitutional law.'  I
will now briefly discuss those cases.
In Printz v.  United States, the  Court held that Congress lacked  the
*  Carmack Waterhouse  Professor of Constitutional  Law.  Georgetown  University Law Cen-
ter.  I would like to thank Matthew Adler, VickiJackson, and the participants  in  ie  Symposium
for comments that assisted me in preparing this Essay.
IJohn H. Langbein, Cultural  Chauvinism in Comparatie  Law'. 5  ARDOZ  oJ. NT'L & COMP. L
41, 48 (1997)  (questioning the portability of basic legal institutions across cultures).
2 Those efforts by U.S.  constitutionalists to instruct others bring to mind an early spate of
interest in the exportation of  Vestern" legal norms in the 1950's and 1960's, when those norms
were  said to  be essential preconditions  for economic  development.  For  a retrospective  and
skeptical look at that effort, see David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholarn  &lf.Esrange7rent:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and  Development Studies in the United  States 4 WIS. L  REv.  1062,
1063  (1974)  (suggesting that legal  developmental  assistance  may not be contributing  to  free-
dom, equality, participation, and shared rationality).
S And,  perhaps,  to  take advantage  of the  opportunities for travel,  cultural  learning, and
tourism associated with those efforts.  See id. at 1067.
4  SeePrintz v. United States, 117 S. C.  2365 (1997); Raines v. Byrd. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
power  to  require  state  law  enforcement  officials  to  conduct  back-
ground checks on prospective gun purchasers.5  Such  a requirement,
the  Court  held,  was  inconsistent with  the  principles  of dual  sover-
eignty embodied  in  the  U.S.  constitutional  system.6  Justice  Breyer,
dissenting, argued  that experience  in  other federal  systems  demon-
strated that the Court's notion of sovereignty was not an essential part
of federalism.  According  to Justice  Breyer, when  interpreting  our
Constitution, judges  could appropriately  draw  on constitutional  ex-
periences  elsewhere, which could serve  to "cast an empirical light on
the  consequences  of different  solutions  to  a  common  legal  prob-
lem."8  Justice  Scalia addressed  this concern, stating that experience
in other systems might properly bear on  designing  a constitution, but
not on interpreting  the one we already have.9
In  Raines v.  Byrd, the  recent  line  item  veto  case,  Chief Justice
Rehnquist ended his discussion of whether legislators had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act with the ob-
servation  that  "[t]here  would be  nothing irrational  about  a  system
which granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional
courts operate under one or another variant of such a regime.  But it
is obviously not the regime that has obtained under our Constitution
to date."1 0  Support for Rehnquist's dismissal of constitutional borrow-
ing, however,  is  not unanimous  among  members  of the  Court.  In
addition to Justice  Breyer's  clear support of borrowing in Printz,  Jus-
tice Souter's concurring opinion in Raines noted that the question of
whether the legislators  had suffered  an injury of the sort that would
authorize standing in accordance with the Court's prior decisions was
"fairly debatable."'  Such  controversial  domestic  issues might be re-
solved  by  considering  foreign  constitutional  experience,  as Justice
Breyer  did in Printz  If legislator standing appears  to have  operated
reasonably well in other constitutional systems, one might think that
allowing  it within  the bounds  of our own  established  constitutional
5  See Printz, 117 S.  Ct. at 2384.
6  See id.
See id. at 2404.
8  Id at 2405.
9  See id. at 2377  n.11.  The positions taken by Justices  Scalia and  Breyer are different,  but
the real difference does not reside in the distinction justice Scalia drew between  interpreting  and
writing  a constitution.  Justice Breyer argued that the Supreme Court should examine  the stan-
dard sources for constitutional interpretation when  trying to decide whether a federal statute  is
constitutional.  If those sources run out, the Court is faced with a question of constitutional pol-
icy,  and its judgment on that question may properly  be informed by constitutional  experience
elsewhere. Justice Breyer saw Pri  ntz as a case in which the standard sources had indeed run out.
justice Scalia disagreed only with that latter claim.  He might also disagree with  the propriety of
the Court makingconstitutional policy, as his insistence on avoiding balancing in Printz suggests.
For an extended  discussion of the latter point, see Vicki  C. Jackson,  Federalism  and the Uses and
Limits ofLaw: Printz and Principle, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2180 (1998).
,0 Raines, 117 S.  CL at 2322  (citations omitted).
n  See id. at 2323 (Souter,J., concurring in the judgment).
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doctrine  would not  simply  consist  of "nothing  irrational,"'2  as  the
Chief Justice  claimed, but instead would  be positively desirable  as  a
means of improving the operation of the U.S. constitutional system.
These discussions of recent comparative constitutional  experience
introduce one of my themes in this Essay;  namely, the difficulty of de-
termining when a borrowing or importation is successful, and how to
approach  or analyze  that success.  The Essay  sketches  issues  associ-
ated  with  constitutional  borrowing  or  lending,  which  are  familiar
within the field of comparative law, and discusses three problems as-
sociated with reciprocal learning from foreign constitutional  experi-
ences."  After  identifying  some  difficulties  associated  with  defining
successful learning, the Essay takes up the complex issue of determin-
ing  the  relevant  units  of  comparison.  Finally,  it  examines  one
prominent approach  to  (or defense  of) learning from foreign expe-
rience.  I call  the  approach  the  functionalist  approach,  and  argue
that it may founder on problems associated with identifying functions
and the institutions that perform them in different legal systems.
The overview I present may say little or nothing new to scholars of
comparative  law, but may nonetheless be useful  to U.S. constitution-
alists  who  have  taken  advantage  of new  opportunities  for constitu-
tional comparison, and who may know much about constitutionalism
but relatively little about comparative  law.  I believe  the issue of bor-
rowing or lending is best focused by  thinking about  the claim  that
comparative  study  is  helpful  because  it  may  dispel  a  parochial
scholar's  sense of  "false  necessity,"  or  the  belief that  the  arrange-
ments that are familiar to  the parochial scholar are  necessary  to se-
cure whatever  it is that the scholar considers valuable  in a particular
system.  My comments may be taken  as reflections  on an issue  that
arises  from  this  claim:  Why  should  we  think  that  the  parochial
scholar misunderstands  the  circumstances  as false necessities,  rather
than, for example,  arrangements  that are  essential within  the social
system in which the constitutional regime is set?
1.  Defining  success-  What criteria might we use to determine when
one constitutional system's borrowing, lending, or importing is "suc-
cessful?"  According  to Professor Jonathan  Miller's  recent study, Ar-
gentine constitutionalists  engaged in an extensive debate in the mid-
nineteenth century, leading to the adoption of the U.S. constitutional
model for Argentina.'"  He  shows that the model's influence  was so
12 Id. at2322.
IS 1 use the term "learning" to refer to a process in which one person or s)stem makes a rea-
soned judgment that it would be helpful to take into its own operation some institution, rule, or
doctrine used elsewhere.  This distinguishes  my concerns about reciprocal  learning from con-
cerns  about broader processes such as influence,  which need  not be, uith my usage, as con-
scious as learning.
14 SeeJonathan  M. Miller,  The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study  of U&  Conshtiuhanal
Practice  as  Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and  the Argoitine Elite's Leap of Fazth, 46 A.!.  V.
L  REv. 1483 (1997)  (recounting the history of the Argentine constitutional convention).
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strong that Argentine  courts  "would overrule  reasonable  interpreta-
tions of the Argentine  Constitution  solely because  the  precedent  in-
volved  was  contrary  to  their increasing  understanding  of U.S. prac-
tice." " '  Was the U.S. model successfully imported into Argentina?
Professor Miller says yes:  "One of the lessons to be learned is that
copying a foreign constitution can work." 6  This statement may seem
surprising in context, for it follows  a paragraph  noting that "[m] ost
elections  until...  1916 were  fraudulent,"  that five "[m]ajor  revolts"
occurred between  1874 and 1905, and that "[flederalism,  extensively
provided for in the Constitution, never became  a reality." 7  If "work-
ing" means something like  establishing  a reasonably stable social order re-
sembling that in the system from which the constitution was copied, it is hard
to understand how Argentina's copying worked.
Professor  Miller,  however,  offers  a different,  and more  provoca-
tive, definition  of success.  In his view,  copying works when it fulfills
the intentions of those doing it:
[N]ineteenth  century  Argentine  constitutionalism  was  a
failure if analyzed  in terms of social and economic  equality,
the democratic  nature  of its  elections,  or the implementa-
tion of all  aspects  of its written  text.  It was  an  enormous
success,  however,  in  terms of what  its  designers  wished  to
accomplish - to  encourage  immigration  and  to  stimulate
economic growth 9
Focusing  on framers'  intentions  raises some intriguing questions.
Consider first what simple enactment  of a constitution might accom-
plish.  Professor  H.W.O.  Okoth-Ogendo  describes  an "African  politi-
cal  paradox":  the  widespread  adoption  of apparently  meaningless
constitutions in Africa.20  According  to  Professor Okoth-Ogendo,  Af-
rican constitutions are primarily declarative.2'  They assert - to rulers,
to the ruled, and to the international  community - that the nation is
sovereign, self-governing  according to  principles that are organically
connected  to  the nation  itself.22  These assertions matter,  I suppose,
because  the  audiences  believe  that sovereignty  is  important  in  the
modern world.  Yet even here there remains a problem:  What if the
15 Id. at 1491.
16 Id at 1487.
17  I1.  at 1486-87.
18 Miller himself concedes that, measured in conventional terms, the Argentine constitution
has not been entirely successful:  "Assuming that an important part of constitutionalism involves
the establishment of rules that provide sufficient security to  all politically significant groups in
society so that they join the system rather than engage  in armed revolt, Argentine constitution-
alism was only a partial success."  Id. at 1534.
19  Id.  at 1492.
H.W.O.  OKOTH-OGENDO,  Constitutions Without  Constitutionalism: Reflections  on an African
Political  Paradox, in  CON=TITUTIONALISM  AND  DEMOcRAcY:  TRANSITIONS  IN THE  CONTEMPORARY
WORLD  65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
21  See id. at 67.
2  See id. at 68.
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assertion of sovereignty in this sense is belied by actual experience?' -
How  can  we understand  these  problematic  "successes"?  I think
the answer  lies in a combination  of intentions,  to which  Professors
Miller and Okoth-Ogendo  direct our attention,  and audience.  The
authors  of the Argentine  and African  Constitutions  intended  to ac-
complish  something-immigration  and economic  growth  in Argen-
tina, 4 and sovereignty in Africa.25  They were successful  because  the
audiences  that mattered  were  satisfied  by what was  actually  accom-
plished.  Professor Miller's study of Argentina suggests  that the Con-
stitution provided enough stability for immigrants and investors, and
that the political  corruption he documents  may  have  itself provided
the needed  stability for growth.26   At the  same  time,  however,  the
Constitution  provided  little  stability  to  those  in  society,  including
workers, who engaged in repeated revolts."
Other difficulties arise, however, if the criteria for successful bor-
rowing, importation, or lending of constitutional ideas rest on under-
standing framers'  intentions and identifying relevant audiences.  For
example, intentions  may not be  transparent, and what  the), "really"
are may become  clear only after a fair amount of time.  I have  little
doubt that an ingenious analyst could almost alwa)s  come up with  a
clever account  of intentions  and audiences  that demonstrated  how
any constitutional  provision  that hung in for long enough  was  suc-
cessful.
Finally, a borrowing might be called successful  if it contributed  to
the achievement of governmental  legitimacy, or to the attainment of
liberal democratic rule, as both Professors Miller and Okoth-Ogendo
suggest.2  As I will argue later, causal claims of this sort are quite hard
to establish.7  In addition, and perhaps more troubling, it is unclear
how  these  criteria  for  successful  borrowing  or  importation  would
help one study or learn from  comparative  constitutional  law.  The first
step in the analysis would be to specify a range of constitutional  sys-
tems  compatible  with  the  philosophical  presuppositions  of liberal
23 A similar difficulty arises in connection  ith a slightly different version of constitution-as-
declaration.  International lending bodies typically require that borrowers satisfy some  modest
rule-of-law requirements, and constitutions in the proper form  might be used  to demonstrate
sufficient compliance with those requirements to allow transactions  to go forward.  But again  a
disjuncture between the nominal constitution and the rule-of-law reality may occur.
24 SeeMiller, supra note 14, at 1492.
See OKOTH-OGENDO,  supra  note 20, at 67.
2  See Miller, supra  note 14, at 1534-1541.
See id.
See id. at 1485 ("Remarkably,  Argentina offers an example not only of the adoption of a
foreign  constitutional model,  but of the  foreign model  quickly becoming  an article  of faith.
thereby increasing the legitimacy of the Argentine political life."); OKOTH-OGENDO.  supra note
20, at 67 ("[T]he constitution  [in African countries]  is an act without which  the polity can have
no legitimate or sovereign existence ....  ").
See infra notes 39-47 and  accompanying  text  (discussing  the  difficulty of distinguishing
between  consequences resulting from the borrowing of constitutional  provisions and  those re-
sulting from other factors).
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democracy.s°  The  next step  would  be  to  specify  the  empirical  pre-
conditions  for  the  realization  of a  constitutional  system  within  the
specified  range.3'  This  is  indeed  a  comparative  exercise,  but it ap-
pears more like an exercise in comparative  politics than in compara-
tive  constitutional  law.  Perhaps,  however,  a scheme  might  develop
along these lines:  There  are several  possible constitutional  arrange-
ments consistent with  any specified empirical precondition, and bor-
rowing or importing one such arrangement will most likely succeed,
while borrowing or importing an arrangement inconsistent with  that
precondition will not.  One might question the value  of the  enter-
prise defined in  this way,  primarily because  it seems  that one  could
reach the same conclusion more directly.
2.  The unit of comparison:  Both the criteria for evaluating success-
ful importations or borrowings and the likelihood of success may dif-
fer depending on whether one considers the importation  or borrow-
ing of an entire constitutional system, as in the Argentine example, or
the  importation  or borrowing  of a particular  constitutional  innova-
tion, as in the legislator standing example.  This distinction, however,
must be deployed carefully.  A particular provision may be intimately
connected to  other provisions, sometimes in obvious ways, and some-
times in less obvious ways.  For example,  legislator standing is rather
clearly connected  to  provisions  that authorize judicial review  at  the
instance  of private parties who suffer traditional injuries.  One classic
analysis  of U.S. standing law argued against expanding the concept of
injury,  claiming  that doing  so would  lead  to  a world  in which  "the
halls  of Congress  and of the  state  legislatures  would  become  with
regularity  only Act  I  of any contest  to enact  legislation  ....  Act  II
would, with the usual brief interlude, follow in the courts." 33  In areas
other  than  legislator standing,  however,  concepts  of injury  have ex-
panded  in  the United States,  and the  interlude  between  enactment
and challenge has generally become briefer and briefer."  Legislator
standing  now fits more  comfortably into the  United  States'  modern
system of judicial  review than it would have  before the  expansion  of
the concept of injury.
30  The range might be large, as it is with respect to basic institutional arrangements  (such  as
the  process by which laws are enacted),  or small, as it is with  respect to fundamental  human
rights  (such as those acknowledged in international human rights documents).
See, e.g., Robert A.  Dahl,  Why All Democratic  Countries  Have Mixed Economies, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY:  NoMos  XXXV 259  (John W. Chapman  & Ian Shapiro eds.,  1993)  (arguing  that
democracy is incompatible with both command economies and strictly free market economies).
32  Unless, of course,  the borrowed or imported arrangement is consistent with some  other
empirical  precondition and its use does not impair the ability of the constitutional system  as a
whole to satisfy the entire set of empirical preconditions.
33  Ernest I.  Brown,  Quis Custodiet Ipsos Cwtodes?-The School-Prayer  Cases, 1963  SuP.  Gr. REV.
1,15-16  (1963).
This is sometimes attributable  to legislators themselves, who authorize expedited  appeals.
See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313  (1990)  (reviewing dismissal of flag burning
charge pursuant to statutory provision requiring expedited consideration).
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There is also, however, a more subtle connection  between legisla-
tor standing and the rest of the constitutional system.  In separation-
of-powers constitutional  systems,  legislators  bargain with  each  other
and with the executive, with  an eye to the  next election.'"  In parlia-
mentary systems, legislators who are members of the minority seek to
erode public support for the majority  party or coalition, with an  eye
to the next election. 36  Systems ofjudicial review affect the bargaining
or electoral  structure  within  which  legislators  act,"  while  legislator
standing gives legislators  in the  minority a new bargaining chip.  In
the absence of legislator standing these legislators can only hope that
someone with  traditional standing will  invoke judicial  review.  With
standing, legislators  can guarantee  that  they will  invoke judicial re-
view if they are unsatisfied with  legislation  the majority enacts.  The
difference  between an Act II that is certain, and an Act U that is only
probable,  affects  bargaining  positions  within  the  legislature  and,
therefore, affects the legislation that actually emerges from the legis-
lative process as  a whole.  There are  undoubtedly even  more subtle
interactions  between  legislator  standing and  the  legislative  process,
but these  examples  are sufficient  to  make  a point that will  play  an
important part in what follows:  one probably must distinguish among
the borrowing or importation of entire constitutional regimes at one
extreme, discrete constitutional provisions at the other, and modules
or  complexes  of  interconnected  constitutional  provisions  in  be-
tween.ss
The question of the unit of comparison  inevitably leads  to other
difficulties,  which  are  most  obvious  when  one  considers  constitu-
tional  systems  as a whole.  As Robert Dahl has suggested,  there  are
simply  a finite  number  of competing  models  available  that  reflect
large-scale  constitutional borrowing arrangements."  A constitutional
system can have plurality elections or proportional  representation, a
presidential  or parliamentary  system,  a federal  or a centralized  sys-
tem, judicial  review or no judicial  review. 40  Once  these  choices  are
mixed and matched, a comparative  analysis will be dealing with rela-
&eW'illiam  N. Eskridge,Jr.,  The Substane of the New Legal Proass, 77 CkL  L  REV.  919. 935
(1989)  (identifying the  principle aim of statutes as memorializing the  bargaining of election-
minded legislators).
See Dominique Leydet,  Pluralism and the Crisis of Parliamentaq  Denocraty, 10  Co;. J.L &
JURus. 49, 58 (1997)  (explaining the power that parliamentary minorities  ield over majorities).
See Robert K. Rasmussen,  Coalition Formation  and the Pesumption of RemabiltT:  A Respm
to Rodriguez, 45 VAND.  L. REV. 779, 786 (1992)  (acknowledging that existence ofjudicial review
mayaffect deals struck among bargainers).
I suggest later in this Essay that it is uncertain whether there are anv constitutional provi-
sions that are truly discrete, or - probably more  accurately - whether  there are any modules
that are reasonably small.  See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
SSee Robert A. Dahl, Thinking  About Democratic  Constitutionr  Condusionsfrom Dem cratic  Exp,.
ijnce, in NOMOS XXXVIII:  POLInCAL ORDER  175,  185  (Ian Shapiro  & Russell  Hardin  eds..
1996).
40 See id. at 183-86 (listing ten basic structural choices).
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tively small "n's," with the  consequence  that it will  be difficult to  de-
termine whether  any results one observes  occur because  of the insti-
tutional  characteristics  of  the  constitutional  provisions  borrowed,
their interaction with other constitutional  arrangements  (which may
eliminate  the possibility of productive  comparison),  or the historical
peculiarities  of the  systems  in  which  those  provisions  are  located."
For  example,  Dahl  points  out  that  "[a]mong  the  twenty-two  older
democratic countries, only six are strictly federal.  In all six countries,
federalism  is  the  result of special  historical  circumstances." 42  Infer-
ring anything about federalism from the  experiences  of those  coun-
tries would be unjustified.  Perhaps  the  only relevant  constitutional
experiences  are  those  that  have  so large  an overlap  that we  might
fairly  say that  constitutional  systems  have  arrived at  a  consensus  on
the  question.  A good example  might be  the nearly  universal  rejec-
tion of the  U.S. practice in which  constitutional judges with  a large
degree of responsibility have life tenure. 43
Dahl  is also aware  of another difficulty  created  by  his use of the
phrase "strictly federal."  He points out that proportional representa-
tion systems vary significantly in the  details of their operation,  as do
all  the  other major structural  features of constitutional  democracy."
The  details  can range  from mundane  but consequential  matters  to
more  dramatic  choices.  For  example,  an  issue  that  arose  in  Ger-
many's consolidation was the threshold for winning representation  in
parliament. 45  The required percentage  might be considered  a mere
technical detail, and yet, it seems likely  to be of great consequence.
An inherently more sensational decision has been the use of a list sys-
41  See, e.g.,  THE  FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL  DEMOCRACY  (Juan  L.  Linz &  Arturo Valenzuela
eds., 1994).  The essays include Linz's argument that the structural characteristics of a U.S.-style
presidential  system make the system more likely to fail than a parliamentary one, either because
of electoral  paralysis or because  of replacement  by a military or other non-democratic  regime.
Linz's essay, and the others, often shifts between generalizations and qualifications based on  the
specific characteristics  of individual regimes.
42 Dahl, supra note 39, at 183.
43  For a short discussion of the problems  associated with life tenure, see LA. Powe, Jr., Old
People and Good Behavior, 12  CONST.  COMM.  195  (1995).  The standard  of consensus  must be
used with caution, however.  For example,  there appears to be an international consensus  that
restrictions on so-called  hate speech  are generally consistent with free  speech principles.  See
also MariJ. Matsuda, Public  Response to Racist Speech: Considering  the Victim's Story, 87 MiC.  L. REv.
2320, 2346-48 (1989)  (arguing that the legal sanctions against racist speech imposed by most of
the common  law  countries  do not violate  free speech  values).  Thus, one  might  reasonably
think that the suspicion of such restrictions reflected in U.S. constitutional law expresses some-
thing distinctive about the United States's raucous, impolite civic culture.  See also, e.g., RA.V. v.
City of St. Paul,  505 U.S.  377,  380  (1992)  (holding that city ordinance  prohibiting display  of
symbols that arouse "anger, alarm,  or resentment" on the basis of race, religion, color, creed, or
gender violates the First Amendment).
44  See Dahl, supra note 39, at 188-89  ("Systems of proportional  representation are capable  of
almost infinite variation.").
45  See PETER  E.  QUINT,  THE  IMPERFECT  UNION:  CONSTITUTIONAL  STRUCTURES  OF  GERMAN
UNIFICATION  66-70  (1997)  ("Struggles  over the  election  law  ...  naturally  increased  tensions
within the fragile GDR (German Democratic Republic) coalition.").
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tern rather than the single, transferable  vote system used in  the Irish
Republic  and favored  by  most scholars  of the subjectE  Dahl  con-
cludes that, because "[e]ach of the major constitutional alternatives  is
subject to such great variation" that "every country's constitutional ar-
rangements are unique." 4 7  This surely makes it difficult to determine
when  a constitutional  structure  or provision  can  be  effectively  bor-
rowed or imported.
3.  Functionalism: With this difficulty in the background,  I turn  to
the question of false necessity.  One broad though dearly  overstated
claim is associated with Montesquieu  and Hegel.  They argued that a
constitutional system is so deeply enmeshed  within  a society's social,
economic,  and political  systems  that  only the  constitutional  regime
that has arisen organically from within the society will be accepted by
the society.  For Montesquieu, "[I]aws.  ..  should be so appropriate  to
the people for whom  they are made  that it is very  unlikely that the
laws of one nation can suit another."" 5  Or, as Hegel put it, a constitu-
tion is "the work of centuries, ...  the consciousness  of rationality  so
far as that consciousness is developed in a particular nation.""
These formulations, of course, do not necessarily rule out the pos-
sibility of successful borrowings.  Montesquieu,  for example, sees suc-
cessful borrowing as merely unlikely, not  imnpossible. " 0  Hegel's formula-
tion raises a potentially  more  interesting  issue:  it suggests  that the
effort to impose a constitutional  regime from outside, as might have
occurred in post-1945 Japan,5'  will be problematic.  Consider, how-
ever, the decisions made by constitutional drafters in eastern Europe,
who  examined foreign  constitutional  experiences  and  chose  those
provisions  that, consistent with the  Hegelian  vision,  were  most suit-
able for their nations. 2  Although particular provisions might be cop-
ied from other constitutional systems, they would  then be organically
adopted  from within.3
See Dahl, supra note 39, at 192.
47 Id. at 188.
48  CHARLES  DE SECONDAT,  BARON  DE  MONTESQUIEU.  THE SPIRIT OF TIE LWs 8  (Anne  m.
Cohler etal. trans. & eds., 1989).
49 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH  HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 286-87  (T.M. Knox trans..
Oxford Univ. Press 1967).
5o See MONTEsQUIEU,  supra  note 48, at 8.
5, See Sylvia Brown  Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanes
Constitution and  Human Rights, 1 U.  PA. J. CONST.  L  (forthcoming  1999)  (discussing  the com-
plexities ofJapan's constitutional regime).
2  See, eg., QUINT, supra note 45, at 28 (explaining how the GDR. in drafting a new constitu-
tion before  unification,  examined the Basic  Law of the West German  Constitutional Court as
well as the  constitutions  of countries such as Spain  and Nicaragua.).  Cf..  S.  R. CO.NST.  of
1996, ch. 2, § 39(1) (c)  ("When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court...  may consider foreign
law.").
The  distinction between organic  adoption and  external  imposition  is, of course,  not as
sharp as the presentation in the text suggests.  For example, how should one characterize a pro-
vision adopted because drafters believe that the provision mill assure international  agencies like
the International  Monetary Fund that the new regime  is an appropriate participant in interna-
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A strong organicist position, in contrast, would argue that all con-
stitutional borrowings  are bound  to fail.  "Failure" can  mean either
that the borrowing will actually impede the accomplishment of some
goals desired by those who borrow the provision, or, to use a botani-
cal metaphor, that the borrowing will "not take."  Borrowings that do
not take  are  failures  because  they  become  irrelevant in  the  system
into which they have been inserted.
The claim of irrelevancy  can  take  many forms.  One form might
be that societies  have  "needs" that their constitutional  systems satisfy
without regard to any particular constitutional provision.  A borrowed
provision  that fails  to satisfy  a society's  needs will  be ignored.  One
that  actively  interferes  with  accomplishing  a  need  will  be  domesti-
cated:  constitutional  interpreters  will  work  out  ways  in  which  the
provision can be made to  conform to  the system's needs.  The result
may be rather dramatic  contrasts between  the way  in which  a provi-
sion works  in the  system  from  which  it  is borrowed  and the  way  it
works in the system into which it is imported. 54
Other versions  of the irrelevancy claim  can be associated with  the
scholarship of Professor Alan Watson.5  Working primarily with  com-
parative  private law, Watson  has persuasively argued  that civil  law so-
lutions to  pervasive  private law problems have been  successfully  bor-
rowed  for  centuries.5   Watson's  preferred  account  of  this
phenomenon  can be fit into the "irrelevancy" category.  Watson's ar-
gument is that law is an internally directed system, driven primarily by
lawyers'  needs for a certain kind of coherence  in the categories  they
use.  Borrowing is common because lawyers find the  conceptual so-
lutions  to  the  common  problems they  face in  other systems.58  Bor-
rowing  succeeds  in  one  sense,  because  it  satisfies  the  internal  de-
mands  of the law, or of lawyers,  yet it is irrelevant in another sense,
because  it has nothing to do with the  overall operation of the politi-
cal,  economic,  or social  system within  which  the  legal  system  is  lo-
cated.
Professor  Ewald  quotes a  "striking passage"  which  he says  asserts
tional  arrangements?  The  provision's  organicist  defenders  might say  that the constitution's
drafters wanted - from within - to participate in the international arrangements,  and therefore
that the particular provision itself arose from within.  The  provision's critics  might see  it  a  a
concession coerced by outside agencies.
I  believe that there is a general sense among scholars thatJapan's  post-1945  constitution
has been thoroughly domesticated in this sense, although it is a special  case because of the con-
stitution's origins  as an imposition on those who quickly attained or returned  to power.
55 See William  Ewald,  Comparative  Jurisprudence  (II):  The Logic  of Legal Transplants,  43 AM. J.
ComP. L. 489, 498  (1995)  (describing various interpretations of Watson's work).
See id. ("[Llegal  borrowings  have  been  the  'most  fertile'  source  of legal  change  in the
Western world.")  (footnote omitted).
5  See  id  at 499  ("[I]n altering  the law  [lawyers]  seek either to play down  the extent of the
change, or to borrow a rule from some foreign legal system ....  ")
See, e.g., ALAN  WATSON,  ROMAN LAW AND  COMPARATIVE  LAW  97 (1991)  (dealing primarily
with borrowing from Roman  civil law).
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Watson's strongest claim. 59 Actually, the quotation suggests its limited
applicability:
The  lesson of history, in fact,  is that over  most of thefield of
law,  and  especially  of private law, in  most  political  and  eco-
nomic circumstances,  political rulers  need have no interest
in determining what the  rules of law are or should be ....
Rulers  and  their immediate  underlings  can  be,  and  often
have  been  and are,  indifferent  to  the  nature  of the  legal
rules in operation6
As with Montesquieu,  the claim is qualified.  More importantly for
present purposes, however, Watson stresses that his claim  is strongest
with  respect  to  private  law.  As  Professor  Ewald  argues,  the  claim
might well be false as to public law.6'  Constitutions of whatever sort,
whether  liberal  democratic  or  otherwise,  create  the  institutions
through  which political  rulers  hold power and  define  the  relation-
ships  among political  rulers  in different  institutions.  Constitutions
may specify limits on the powers of particular political rulers or of the
government as a whole.  Political rulers may have little interest in the
civil law rules allocating losses between  private parties  in contractual
disputes, yet these rulers are likely to have some interest in the public
law rules allocating power among them.  If this is so, political rulers
are  unlikely to leave  the  creation of those  rules to  the professional
judgment of lawyers attempting to work out a system that satisfies the
lawyers'  demands for coherence.
In some instances,  claims about this sort of irrelevance  may have
merit.  Again, however,  the  analysis  is  complicated  by  the fact  that
there are relatively few cases from which we can  draw an inference.
Consider,  for example,  the  question  of the  constitutionality  of af-
firmative  action  programs.  Experience  in  the  United  States,  the
European  Union, and India suggests  that a constitution  containing
only a general requirement of equal treatment will impede the adop-
tion of affirmative action programs.63 The reason may be that lawyers
See Ewald, supra note 55, at 501.
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61  See Ewvald, supra note 55, at 503 ("Nor...  can he claim  that European puthi  law is insu-
lated from political, economic, and social forces.  That conclusion  is most likely (hlse ...  .
Of course, there may be constitutional provisions that arc "fillers," or details that require
specification if the constitution is to establish a government.  The "fillers" could be specified in
many iays, because  the choice among specifications  has  little impact on the  power  relations
which most concern political rulers.  I have  called these provisions aspects of tie "thick" consti-
tution.  See  %lARK  TUSHNET,  THE  CONSTrrUTION  OLUTSIDE  THE  COURTS  (forthcoming  1999)
(manuscript at ch.  1, on file with author).  It is important  to note,  however, that sometimes
these details actually do have effects on the relations among power-holders.
63  See, eg.,  Adarand  Constructors, Inc.  v. Pena,  515  U.S.  200.  227  (1995)  (applying  strict
scrutiny to race-based  federal  affirmative  action  programs  in the  United  States);  Kalanke  v.
Freie Hansestadt Bremen,  1  C.M.LR.  175  (1996)  (appl)ing restrictions on  affirmative  action
programs favoring women in Germany);  GEOFFREY R.  STONE ET AL.,  CO.%s  -TIONL  LW 696-
97  (1996)  (discussing the invalidation of affirmative  action programs  in India  that preference
college admissions on the basis of race and caste).
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have  a  professionalized  understanding  of the  concept  of  equality,
with  which  the  idea  of compensatory  discrimination  is  in tension.
They  may deploy  that understanding  against  affirmative  action  pro-
grams unless  the constitution  they are interpreting expressly author-
izes such programs. 65
Canadian constitutionalists  have pointed to another feature of the
constitutionalized  protection of individual rights.  As they see it, con-
stitutional  systems inevitably balance the  rights they establish  against
other  social interests.66  They  recommend,  therefore,  that those  re-
sponsible for interpreting  constitutions  do  their best to  draft  provi-
sions  that  balance  the  individual's  rights  against  other  social  inter-
ests. 67  For example,  Section  1  of the  Canadian  Charter  asserts  the
unconstitutionality  of restrictions on rights unless the restrictions can
be "demonstrably justified  in a free and democratic  society."  While
the  language  of the  Canadian  Charter  differs from  that of the  U.S.
Constitution,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Canadian  constitutionalists
could  assert  that a  provision  such  as  Canadian  Charter's Section  1
provides  more  guidance  than  the  unstructured  balancing  inquiries
sometimes undertaken in U.S. constitutional  law.63  Thus, this balanc-
ing approach may lie  on the borderline between  the interpretive  ap-
proaches generated  by lawyers'  professionalism  and those  generated
by regime requirements.  It seems likely that lawyers who are typically
trained  to  resolve  conflicts  will  be inclined  to  think  that balancing
competing interests  is  the most rational way of resolving problems.
Even more likely, these lawyers will be inclined  to think that political
rulers  will not tolerate  a  constitutional  system  that directs  decision-
makers to  ignore  the social  interests that the rulers seek  to  advance
through legislation.
Essentially, Watson  argues that borrowings  may be internally suc-
cessful within the legal system but externally irrelevant to the political
or economic  system because  political rulers often do not care  about
the content of the  borrowed rules in civil law.  When  political rulers
See, e.g.,  GERALD A.  BEAUDOIN  &  ED  RATuSHNY, THE  CANADIAN  CHARTER  OF RIGHTS  AND
FREEDOMS  598  (1989)  ("[A]  program would  be suspect if the criteria for inclusion  ...  were in-
consistent with the goal  of  ameliorating disadvantage.").
65  See,  e.g.,  CAN.  CONST.  (Constitution  Act,  1982)  pt.  I  (Canadian  Charter  of Rights  and
Freedoms),  §  15(2);  see also BEAUDOIN  & RATUSHNY,  supra note  64, at 596-97  (discussing the
purpose of Section  15(2)).
See, e.g.,  BEAUDOIN & RATUSHNY,  supra note 64,  at 597-98  ("[Siection  15 will  sometimes
require consideration of competing equality interests.").
See i&. at 153  ("The decision-maker  must be careful  to appreciate  and to express  the con-
flicting and competing values and interests involved.").
See id  ("There are differences between the United States Bill of Rights and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms but concerning  the need  to compare  the relative  importance
of competing public values as explained, they reach the same dilemma and solve it in the same
way."-).
See Mark Tushnet,  Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory,  83 MICH.  L. REv.  1502,
1517  (1985)  (discussing one critique  of balancing which  "focuses  on  the people  who  do the
balancing" -judges,  who are "all lawyers").
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do care, however, borrowings will succeed only to the extent that they
satisfy the  political  rulers'  interests.  Determining  when  borrowings
succeed requires a detailed study of the political and economic order
into which the constitutional  provision will be inserted."'
A functional account  of the borrowing  phenomenon  is  inconsis-
tent with the strongest formulations of Watson's arguments.7'  In this
account, private law problems arise from human interactions that oc-
cur everywhere.  There may be a relatively small number of legal solu-
tions to those problems that will satisfy people regardless of their cul-
tural  predispositions.  For example, citizens  may understand  a wide
range  of interactions  as  being economic  in nature,  thus  generating
problems that are best solved by rules that produce  economically  effi-
cient outcomes.2  Further, it might be that for each  problem there
are only a handful of rules that do produce such results.  Finally, bor-
rowing a successful rule from a foreign system may be easier than try-
ing to come up with a new one that might not even work as well.  On
this account, borrowing is successful, but, in an important wray,  irrele-
vant.  The success  flows not from the rule but from  the  rule's func-
tional suitability.7 3
I used  an  economic  example  to demonstrate  functionalism,  but
one can make claims about functionalism in more purely political set-
tings.  Even  so, difficulties  attend functionalist  comparisons.  At the
most general level  there is the difficulty of identifying  functions in a
way that goes beyond platitudes.  It may be said  that every  political,
social, and economic  system has the function of securing the condi-
tions for its own reproduction.  Perhaps  one  can  search  for institu-
tions that seem to serve this function in different systems, but it is un-
clear whether this search will be productive.
10  This seems similar to the public law version of what Ewald calls Watson's  'weak insulation
thesis."  See Ewald,  supra note  55, at 501,  504  (describing "a subtle and intricate interrelation-
shi? that must be studied case-by-case").
72 See id at 501 (describing Watson's "strong insulation thesis7).
My formulation refers to participants'  understandings.  A thorough  evolutionary account
could  eliminate such a reference  by arguing that only those  rules  that support  economically
efficient outcomes  ill survive:  actors governed by other rules will  simply lose out in economic
competition.
'5 Watson's approach may be consistent with  functionalist claims  if those  claims  are suffi-
ciently confined.  As I understand  Ewald's account, Watson does  reject functionalist claims at
the broadest level, in that he denies that any particular diil law rule (or, perhaps. set of rules) is
required to satisfy the requirements  of any particular political, social,  or economic order.  Ac-
cording  to Ewald,  Watson  only argues  against  the claim  that there is a good finctionalist ac-
count for evety rule.  As I read Ewald's interpretation of Watson, however, Watson does not deny
that there may be good functionalist accounts avilable for some rules.  See Euald, supra note 55,
at 502-03.
74 The functionalist approach,  which flourished in U.S. sociology in the 1950s. has  been se-
verely criticized for imposing functionalist categories on systems whose most  important chamc-
teristics may  be that  they can  develop  their own  categories  of understanding  from  within.
These difficulties may be less significant for comparative  constitutionalism than  they are for so-
ciology.  Consider  can a system re-import a  transformed  constitutional  institution  from an-
other system to  which it also  had been exported?  That question  will be answvered,  if at all, by
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Even  within  the  functionalist  approach  there  is  the  difficulty  of
identifying  the  relevant  units  of comparison.  Functionalist  analysis
asks  us to  identify some function  that is being performed in  two  or
more systems.  Applied to constitutional institutions, it then asks us to
identify  the institutions that perform  that function.  There is no rea-
son  to  think that the two  institutions  we identify will correspond  in
any useful way to legal categories.
Here is a speculative  example of the problem, which illustrates the
contours of functional  analysis.  Suppose that liberal  democratic  sys-
tems must have institutions that secure the cultural conditions for the
perpetuation  of democracy.  One might find that in some  constitu-
tional systems  these institutions  are primarily the institutions  of civil
society.  In other systems, where such institutions are perhaps weaker,
they are the institutions of public education.
A more  concrete  example  of the  problems  associated  with  the
functionalist approach  is provided in the literature  on consolidating
the democratic transition in central and eastern Europe."  Most ana-
lysts appear to think that the formerly communist nations of these lo-
cales  face  two related  problems:  establishing  a regime in which  the
76 rule  of law  is  routinely honored ,  and  creating  the  conditions  for
popular  participation  in governance.  I believe  it  is widely  thought
that accomplishing the first goal requires enacting a firm rather than
a flexible constitution and having some form of  judicial review.  Ste-
phen  Holmes and Gass Sunstein have  theorized, however,  that com-
bining a fairly inflexible - that is, not easily amendable - constitution
with judicial  review may discourage  popular participation  in govern-
ance  The theory maintains that people may find their political ini-
tiatives  defeated by the court's  invocation of a  constitution that they
cannot readily get around, and may thus become  discouraged  about
participating in the political process.
The  Holmes-Sunstein  argument  is, in one sense,  a vindication  of
functionalism.  It  specifies  a  particular  set  of  institutions  - easy
the first system,  and those  who address it will necessarily use their  own categories, whether  or
not these categories are functional.  The interpretivist critique of functionalism posits that those
within the second system may be mistaken in thinking that the exported institution  actually per-
formed the function for which  they are importing it in the system  in which it was received,  be-
cause  that function  might  have been  irrelevant  to  the first system,  or might have  been  per-
formed by some other institution.  On the other hand, the interpretation  is nonetheless  being
performed from within one system, and if its decision-makers use functionalist analysis, then  the
interpretivist critique may not have much force.
See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard,  Constitution-Making  in Central  and Eastern  Europe,  28 SuFFoLK U.
L. REV.  5, 15-16 (describing the difficulties of constitution-making).
76 What counts as honoring the rule of law  might be controversial,  but such  is beyond  the
scoge of this essay.
See Stephen Holmes  & Cass  R.  Sunstein,  The Politics of Constitutional  Revision in Eastern
Europe, in RESPONDING  To  IMPERFECTION:  THE  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 275, 302-3  (Sanford Levinson ed.,  1995)  ("If the government cannot govern, if it
cannot pass its reform program, for example, public pressure  will mount to throw the hamper-
ing constitution off and govern extraconstitutionally.").
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amendment  coupled with judicial  review - that these  new democra-
cies  need  to  perform  required  functions.  In another sense,  how-
ever, it also raises questions about functionalist comparative  analysis.
For it might be that the "amendmentjudicial  review" package serves
the functions in these democracies  that the institutions of civil society
serve in  others.  And if that is so,  it seems clear  that, while  there  is
plenty to be learned from other aspects of comparative  constitutional
law,  there  are  significant  obstacles  to  gleaning  useful  information
from  the study of borrowing, importing, and lending that  must  be
recognized.
This  concern  aside, in  light of the  Holmes-Sunstein  claim  (that
the  nature  of the  constitutional  arrangements  are  modular),"  my
summary is incomplete.  An additional  element that must be incor-
porated into the module for a full functional analysis is the functional
hypothesis that constitutional systems require mechanisms for adapt-
ing the constitution to external changes.  Constitutional amendment
and judicial review, for example,  are two  prominent  mechanisms  of
adaptation.Y  Judicial  review is most useful  as an adaptation  mecha-
nism when judges use a more functionalist, as opposed to a formalist,
form of analysis."'  If the judges interpreting a constitution  use a for-
malist method of analysis, the constitutional system may be rendered
stagnant, unless the constitution  can be easily amended.  Conversely,
provisions making constitutional amendment difficult might be satis-
factory if the interpreting judges use a functionalist approach.  This
element is important in a system in which there  is a difficult  amend-
ment process  and the interpreting judges use a formalist  approach.
In such a system, adaptation is still  possible if it is relatively  easy  to
remove the judges."  The final  element to  be considered  is  the  re-
moval  of judges.  The adaptation-mechanism  module  thus  includes
"8  See id  at 295  (urging a "general presumption  in favor of flexible amending procedures
dominated by the established powers ....  .").  The example of easy amendment and judicial re-
view also illustrates the modular nature of institutional packages.  To adequately evaluate judi-
cial review, we must also consider the ease or difficulty of amending a constitution.  Is there an-
other  module  that  might be  substituted  for  the  Holmes-Sunstein  recommendation?  One
possibility is  to have  a constitution  that is difficult  to amend  and a constitutional  court that
flexibly interprets the constitution's formal rigidity.  This is discussed in a different context later
in this Essay.  See infra  note 84 and accompanying text.
79  See id.  at 289, 293,  296-99  (referring to the planning or construction  of constitutions on
the basis of standard patterns).
so  For a discussion of whyjudicial  review should be regarded as an  adaptation mechanism,
see Sanford Levinson, How  Many Times Has  the United  States Constitution  Ban Ae.ended? (A) 26; (B)
26; (C) 27;  (D)  27: Accounting for Constitutional Chang4 in  RESpONDIMN  To LMPERFEmmIO.:  THE
THEORY  AND  PRACTICE OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT  13,  21-22  (Sanford  Levinson  ed.,
1995) (discussing whether ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in McCullod t%  Mafiytan=  17  US. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), interpreted or amended the Constitution).
91 See Peter Strauss, Formal  and Functional  Approades to Separation.of-Poars  Question: A Fcish
Inconsisteny., 72 CORNELL  L  REm.  488, 489  (1987)  (noting  te Supreme Court's vacillation  be-
tween using a formalist and functionalist approach  to separation of powers issues).
Or, of course, if it is relatively easy to amend the amending process.
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amendment  provisions, judicial  review,  the  general  interpretive  ap-
proach  taken by thejudges on a constitutional  court, and the tenure
provision for judges.
The  strategy  of examining  modules  of constitutional  provisions
provides  interesting,  manageable  choices  among  alternatives.  This
strategy also seems  to be a helpful  middle ground between  compar-
ing constitutional regimes in the large and comparing very particular-
ized  constitutional provisions, neither of which  alone seems likely  to
illuminate  the question of borrowing, or indeed much of anything at
all.
Even so, there is a problem with  this approach,  in that the search
for  modules  is  arguably  futile.  For  example,  the  adaptation-
mechanism module  starts with the amendment procedures,  expands
to include judicial review, expands again to include the judges' inter-
pretive approaches  and  yet again  to  include  the  tenure  provisions.
This expansion suggests  that a full-scale  analysis will end up with  the
adaptation-mechanism  module  being represented,  with  some  accu-
racy, by the whole constitutional regime.
The worry of the expanding modules is put aside,  however, to re-
turn  with  a functionalist  examination  of Justice  Scalia's  distinction
between  using comparative constitutional  law for purposes of consti-
tutional  design  and using  it for constitutional  interpretation.8  As
noted,  there  may be a near consensus  among constitutional  systems
that "U.S. - style" judicial review is best performed by judges who are
appointed  for  long,  non-renewable,  but  determinate  terms.8  Al-
though  this  may  be  helpful  when  designing new  constitutions,  re-
importing that insight might not seem possible  as an  exercise when
interpreting  the U.S.  Constitution as it currently exists. 8 7
83  For a discussion  of the  relation between interpretive  approaches  and judicial  review, see
Mark Tushnet, Living With a Bill of Rights, in UNDERSTANDING  HUNIAN  RIGHTS  3,  15-16  (Conor
Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996).
After  examining tenure provisions,  the module  will  expand  yet again  to include  an  ex-
amination of procedures, and expand again to examine  how those who appoint judges are se-
lected, and so on until the module consists of the entire constitution.
SeePrintz, 117 S.  Ct. at 2377 n.11  (stating that comparative  analysis, though relevant  to the
task of writinga  constitution, is inappropriate  to the task of interpretinga  constitution).
86 See supra  note 43 and accompanying  text (discussing life tenure).
87 In fact, legislatively imposed,  determinate  terms for federal judges are arguably inconsis-
tent with  the main purpose of constitutional  limits on the powers of the three branches of gov-
ernment.  See RAOUL  BERGER,  IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL  PROBLEMS  300  (1973)  (not-
ing  that  the  purpose  of  term  limits  is  to  "fence  in"  the  legislative  branch).  Berger's
investigation of the impeachment clause illustrates that federal judges hold their offices during
good behavior and  can be removed  from office by impeachment for certain  kinds of miscon-
duct.  See id. at 178.  Impeachment is  a legislative method  of removal,  which the Constitution
makes  cumbersome to ensure  that judges will not be removed for narrow political reasons that
might be brought to bear against unpopular individualjudges.  Berger argues that the existence
of this  legislative  method of removal  does not preclude Congress  from establishing  a judicial
method  of removal  for  "misbehavior,"  a category distinct from  the one  identified  by the  im-
peachment clause.  See id. at 175,  179-80.  This "judicial removal"  arguably does not threaten
separation of powers because it does not allow politically unpopular judges  to be  targeted for
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Conversely,  because  of the  separation  of powers implications,  an
examination of legislator standing may be  usefulS  The examination
raises the functional  claim  that stable  constitutional  systems require
mechanisms  to  promptly  resolve  constitutional  questions  raised  by
statutes  enacted to respond to significant  changes in the social,  eco-
nomic, or political structures.  Without rapid  response mechanisms,
the problems the statutory innovations were intended  to address may
persist,  and  thereby  undermine  societal  stability,  and  possibly  the
constitutional system itself.  Political rulers, who are threatened by in-
stability, will design mechanisms to resolve the uncertainty.
One common response by dissenting legislators  is to seek judicial
review, at their instance.  The constitutional systems in Germany and
France provide examples of different mechanisms  by which they can
do so.  In contrast, the constitutional  status of legislator standing in
the United States is uncertain, the Supreme Court having rejected it
in the first line-item veto case.89  Given  that Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed  that "[t]here  would be  nothing irrational  about a system' "
with legislator standing, can a functionalist show how the experience
with legislator standing in Germany and France might affect how U.S.
constitutional law should deal with legislator standing?
The French and German systems of constitutional review do differ
from the U.S. system,  of course, and perhaps in ways  that affect  the
utility  of legislator  standing.  Initially  designed  "as  an  additional
mechanism  to  ensure  a  strong  executive  by  keeping  Parliament
within its  constitutional role,"9'  the French  Consell constitutionnel has
evolved into a more  general constitutional  courL-  After the parlia-
ment completes its law-making processes,  the Council  may rule on a
law's constitutionality, if asked to do so by the president,  the heads of
the two houses of parliament,  the Prime Minister, and - most impor-
tant here - sixty members of either house.  This last provision  makes
it possible for members of the political opposition  to challenge  laws
enacted by the parliamentary majority.  Review at the instance  of mi-
nority legislators has become the nearly exclusive form of review since
it was instituted in 1974.93  According to political scientist Alec Stone,
removal by legislators.  Finally, determinate  terms specified  by Congress might similarly be said
to pose little threat tojudicial independence, as no one particular judge can be removed  by a
Congress determined to gain political control of the courts.
See; eg., Raines, 117 S. CL at 2323-25  (SouterJ., concurring)  (observing that the question
of whether a legislator has standing involves separation of powers concerns).
89  See i  at 2312.
9D I& at 2322.
91 JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL Lkw 19-20  (1992).
9The  Council retains some of the characteristics  associated with  its origin. and uith tradi-
tional suspension in France  of "government byjudges."  Council members are nominated  by
the president and the heads of the two branches of parliament  They serve nonren~mble nine
year terms.
9s  See BELL,  supra note 91,  at 32;  see  also ALEC STONE,  THE BIRTH  OF JUDICLL  POLITICS IN
FRANCE:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL  COUNCIL  IN COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTVE  4 (1992)  (asserting that
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the Council has reviewed every major statute enacted after 1980.1
4
Germany's  system  of judicial  review rests  on  the  legal  theory  of
Austrian  constitutionalist  Hans  Kelsen,  who  argued  that  constitu-
tional  review  required  a distinct  type  of legal judgment  that  could
best be exercised by a specialist Constitutional Court."'  The Constitu-
tional Court has the power to review legislation  in two ways.  In "con-
crete review," it can hear constitutional challenges brought by citizens
adversely affected  by statutes.  Additionally, it has the  power of "ab-
stract  review."  One  division  of the  Constitutional  Court  will  hear
challenges to  enacted legislation brought to it by the Chancellor,  by
state governments, or on petition by one-third of the members of the
national legislature's lower house, within one month of the law's en-
actment.  This  latter  provision  allows  the  political  opposition  to
mount constitutional challenges  to laws they are unable to defeat leg-
islatively. 96  Constitutional  review resulting from legislator standing is
rare in Germany.  From  1981  to 1987, there were  23 cases  of abstract
review in Germany,  a figure which  includes  both legislator standing
cases  as  well  as  cases  brought  by  state governments.  Contrast  this
relatively low number with the  92 cases  in France  over the same  pe-
riod, where  legislator  standing  is nearly  the  exclusive  source  of re-
view. 97
A functionalist  might  evaluate  the  French  and  German  experi-
ences with legislator standing favorably.  I can do little more than rely
on my general  sense of the literature  on German and French  consti-
tutional  law to offer a rough judgment about how  constitutional  re-
view has operated  in those systems.  With  that caveat,  I  suggest that
both the  French  Constitutional  Council  and  the  German  Constitu-
tional  Court have been countermajoritarian  to some extent, but that
historically, they have been neither dramatically more nor less coun-
review is  the exclusive  tool of the opposition).  Review can  only occur  before a  law is promul-
gated by the President; there is no way the constitutionality can be tested in concrete  cases after
it has been applied.
94  See Alec  Stone, In the Shadow of the Constitutional Council"  The  7Juridicisation"  of the French
Legislative Process, W. EUR.  POL.  16  (Apr. 1989).  The year  1980 is significant because Francois
Mitterand  became  President in  1981,  but his government had  to work with a Council  whose
members had been appointed by Gaullist officials.  More generally, the Council has counterma-
joritarian effects, not only in invalidating legislation as a whole, which it rarely does, but also in
excising some statutory provisions as unconstitutional.  Even  more importantly, the Council is
countermajoritarian  by inducing legislators  to structure their proposals with an eye to what the
Council will do.  See Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and  Democratic  Debilitation:  Comparative  Illumi-
nation of the Countermajoritarian  Doiffculty,  94  MIcH.  L. REV.  245,  265-75  (1995).  It should  be
noted, however, that the French  legal academic Lewis  Favoreu  regards  the Council as  playing
an essentially neutral judicial role throughout its history.  See STONE, supra note 93, at 212-15.
95  Judges serve twelve-year  non-renewable  terms on the Constitutional Court.  They are cho-
sen through a complex process in which both political and legal credentials play an  important
role.
96  According to Stone, Germany's  political culture  induces compromise  before  statutes  are
enacted,  with  the  result that 90%  of all  statutes are  enacted  without  a  dissenting vote.  See
STONE, supra  note 93, at 239.
97  See id.  at 237.
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termajoritarian than the  United States  Supreme Court.  The signifi-
cant structural differences among the institutions, that is, seem not to
have made large  differences  in the way  they act in  their democratic
political systems.9 8  In addition,  the availability of routine and imme-
diate judicial review at the  instance of those who lost in the  legisla-
ture does not appear to have had major effect on the public stature of
either the Council  or the  Constitutional  Court.  At the same  time,
however,  a functionalist  might  point out  that  the routinization  of
making constitutional review at the losers'  instance, might have larger
effects, especially in inducing anticipatory  compromises,  than would
a more focused system of legislator standing.
Drawing on the German experience, a functionalist might attempt
to develop institutional substitutes for the aspects of German political
culture that reduce the incidents of abstract review.  As  I suggest be-
low, one such substitute would be to make review available  only after
the legislature makes a particularized  decision about the value of re-
view with respect  to  specific  pieces  of legislation.  These considera-
tions might lead a functionalist to conclude that legislator standing in
France  and Germany  provided many of the benefits of prompt judi-
cial evaluation  of innovations without producing the harms  that the
Court in Raines  feared, notwithstanding that legislator standing might
be redesigned to reduce some different risks posed by its routine use.
With this in the background, we can turn to the first line-item veto
case.  The Line Item Veto Act provided  that "[a]ny Member of Con-
gress or any individual adversely affected...  may bring an action..."
to  challenge  the  Act's  constitutionality.9  When  several  legislators
who opposed the Act brought such a challenge,  the Supreme  Court
applied its standards  for determining  when a person  is adversely af-
fected by legislation, and concluded  that the  legislators had not suf-
fered an injury of the sort that would allow the courts to decide  their
claims  on the merits.'0  According  to Chief Justice Rehnquist, these
standards were developed  to  "keep [  the Judiciary's power within  its
proper  constitutional sphere  . . . .,0'  Given  the  apparent  Congres-
sional desire for immediate judicial review, it is unclear why the Court
was  concerned  about  staying  "within  [their]  proper  constitutional
sphere."1
12  In  United States v.  Richardson,  Justice  Powell  offered  the
9s  A functionalist would hardly find  this surprising.  Courts are part of the overall  political
system, and it would be unusual to find decisions substantially at odds %vith  the results produced
elsewhere  in their political systems, especially over a sustained period and on matters of funda-
menatal  interest  to  the  regimes'  leading  political  figures.  Se generaly  .L  MN  SHAPIRO,
COURTS: A COMPARATrvE AND POLTcALANALsIS  (1981).
99 2 U.S.C. § 692  (a) (1) (Supp. II  1994).  It also provided  for expedited review  in the Su-
preme Court.  See i&e  §§ 692 (b)-(c).
100  See Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2322  (holding that individual members of Congress did not have a
sufficient personal stake in the dispute and did not allege a sufficiently concrete injury to have
established Article III standing).
101  Id- at 2318.
102  Id.
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standard  explanation:  "[A]llowing  unrestricted...  standing  would
significantly alter the allocation of power at the national  level, with a
shift away from  a democratic  form  of government  ....  [R] epeated
and  essentially  head-on  confrontations  between  the  life-tenured
branch  and the  representative  branches of government  will  not, in
the  long  run,  be  beneficial  to  either." 103   But,  as  Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in Raines, "Congress'  decision  to  grant a  particular
plaintiff  the  right  to  challenge  an  act's  constitutionality...  signifi-
cantly  lessens  the  risk  of  unwanted  conflict  with  the  Legislative
Branch when that plaintiff brings suit. '0 4  When  the courts decide  a
lawsuit  that Congress expressly authorized, they are less likely to pro-
voke a confrontation  even if they hold the underlying statute uncon-
stitutional,  105  because  they are acting  in support of a democratically
made decision to submit the underlying statute to immediate judicial
resolution.l6  A statutory provision that authorizes Congress members
to  sue alleviates  concerns  of confrontation and  confines  the  expan-
sion of judicial power to those  cases that Congress itself identifies as
particularly important.
1 0 7
103 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974)  (Powell,J., concurring)  (addressing
the question of standing in the context of Congress's failure to publish the budget of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency).
104 Raines, 117 S.  Ct. at 2318 n.3.
105 Indeed, one might think that holding a statute expressly authorizing suit unconstitutional
is itself  the sort of confrontation thatJustice Powell  thought the standing doctrine was designed
to avoid.  This may account for the Court's  reluctance  to assert in  Raines that it was,  in fact,
holding the statutory authorization of suit unconstitutional.
106 The concern about "shifting" power seems misplaced if the constitutional system provides
for eventual review, as in the line-item veto example.  The only question  is the timing ofjudicial
intervention, not whether it will happen.  By contrast, in Richardson, no one was likely to be in a
position to challenge  the practice  at issue if the plaintiffs  there were  not.  See Richardson, 418
U.S. at 167.  Thus, there is reason  to conceptualize Richardson as a political question case rather
than a standing case.
107 A functionalist approach  to comparative  constitutional experience  is unlikely  to provide
any leverage on the question of the constitutionality of the line item veto.  Among comparative
constitutionalists,  the U.S. presidential  system is generally thought to be unique.  See GIOVANNI
SARTORI,  COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL  ENGINEERING:  AN  INQUIRY  INTO  STRUCTURES,
INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES  86 (1994)  (referring to "the exception of the United States").
All presidential systems face the possibility of divided government in which the president
has  one political  agenda, and  the legislature  has another.  Most presidential  systems provide
enough power in the presidency that the president prevails in such  cases.  It is therefore quite
unusual for a president to be faced with a budget with which he or she disagrees; as a result, it is
generally unnecessary for a president to have the power to veto particular items in a budget.  See
id.
The closest analogue  to the U.S. experience  with  divided government is probably the ex-
perience  in France  with  cohabitation,  "where the president and  prime minister are leaders  of
opposing political  coalitions with antagonistic  programs."  Jean  V. Poulard,  The French Double
Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation,  105 POL  SCI.  Q. 243,  254  (1990).  Cohabitation  in
France existed when  the socialist president Francois Mitterand  governed with the conservative
prime ministerJacque  Chirac.  Students of that period suggest that political outcomes resulted
less from any structural characteristics  of the French  constitution - from which a functionalist
might draw lessons - than  from  the particular  talents and balance  of power between  the  two
leaders.  See id.
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This  decision  delayed judicial  review.  If prompt judicial  review
was desirable,' s the  Court might have  drawn on  the apparently suc-
cessful use of legislator standing in France  and  Germany  to justify a
finding of standing here.  A functionalist might note that France and
Germany  are  also  democracies,  and that judicial  review  is  as  coun-
termajoritarian  there  as  it  is  in  the  United  States.  Nor  are  their
courts held in any lower  esteem than  are  the  U.S.  courts;'"  indeed,
one might suggest that the  German  Constitutional  Court is perhaps
the  most widely  respected  governing  institution  in  Germany."'"  If
those systems find that legislator standing is useful, and that it serves
the same countermajoritarian  functions as does the United States Su-
preme  Court,  perhaps  there  are  fewer  functionalist  arguments
against legislator standing than the analysis of Raines might suggest.
What is needed is an opening for interpretation.  That opening is
provided  by  the  plain  language  of  the  statute.  The  Court  asked
whether the  legislators were  adversely affected.  However,  the statu-
tory language seems straightforward:  "[a]ny  Member of Congress  or
any individual  adversely  affected.""'  The provision's  natural,  more
accurate reading is that any person who is adversely affected may sue,
and that any member of Congress may sue, without regard to whether
that member  is adversely  affected."2   That reading would open  the
way  to  considering  the  constitutionality  of the  statute  specifically
authorizing legislator standing, an issue which  might be  illuminated
by comparative experience.
''  But seeNeal Devins & Michael A.  Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and  the .1edern
Supreme Court's Attempt  to  Control Constitutional Confrontatios, 86  GEO.  .J.  351.  365..66  (1997)
(arguing that prompt judicial reiew was not particularly desirable because  it allowed Congress
to shirk its responsibility).  As their title suggests, Deins and Fitts are concerned  ith a timing
question more  traditionally slotted under the doctrinal heading  ripmess than  ith the plaintiff-
identity question addressed  by standing doctrine.  S&e id.  They argue that  a decision  on  the
Line Item Veto Act's constitutionality ought to have been informed by experience  ith the AcL
This argument,  however,  assumes a particular %iew  of what  properly goes  into constitutional
interpretation;  that is, it rests on the  iew that separation-of-powers jurisprudence ought to be
functional  rather than formaL  SeeStrauss, supra note 81,  at 516-26.  Moreovr, it is not dcear that
modem methods of prompt review allow enough experience to accumulate so that the courts'
judgment would be significantly more informed by waiting.
Supporting Devins and Fitts is the fact that the statute itself authorizes the veto only if the
President determines that the deletion of an expenditure will "reduce the Federal budget deft-
cit."  2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (A) (i).  If current projections of federal budget surpluses are correct, this
a determination  that will apparently be impossible for any president to make  before  the Act
sunsets in 2005.
J1  James L.  Gibson et al., On the Legitimac, of National  High Court%  92 Ast.  POL So.  REv.  343,
351  (1998)  (reporting a slightly higher level  of diffuse support for the German  Constitutional
Court from West Germans than for the U.S.  Supreme Court among knowledgable citizens).
110  See Donald  Kommers,  The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System,  26
Comt'. PoL  STuD.  470, 471  (1994)
1  2 U.S.C. § 692(a) (1)  (emphasis added).
11  If the statute required  that only members of Congress who were adversely affected  could
sue,  then specifically  authorizing suit  by members of Congress would  be  redundant.  Those
members of Congress would fail  ithin the class of 'persons adversely affected" who are author-
ized to sue under the second clause.
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How much  can  a functionalist make  of the  preceding  argument
for interpreting  the statute and the Constitution to authorize legisla-
tor standing?  The most a functionalist can truly claim is that mature
constitutional systems in which judicial review plays an important part
should find it useful to have mechanisms for relatively prompt review
of significant  constitutional  innovations."'  Legislator standing, how-
ever, is only one such mechanism.
The  United  States  constitutional  system  routinely  allows  pre-
enforcement  review of newly  enacted statutes at the  behest of those
who would be adversely  affected were  the  statutes  to  go into  effect.
For  example,  it seemed  unremarkable  that  the  courts  enjoined  the
operation  of  the  Communications  Decency  Act  before  it  took  ef-
fect.114  The  courts  have  constructed  reasonably  prompt  review
mechanisms from traditional materials.  These materials include  the
law defining what constitutes  a harm against which the courts protect
individuals,  the law of sovereign immunity, the amenability of officials
to  injunctive  proceedings,  and  the  law  of  temporary  injunctions.
These mechanisms, moreover, are not only available  when a particu-
larly  important legislative  innovation  is  involved.  Instead,  they  are
generally  available  as long as the  courts are satisfied that the criteria
they have set out are met.n'
Congress sometimes uses another review mechanism, the statutory
provision requiring courts to provide expedited consideration of con-
stitutional  challenges  to particular  statutes.1 6  These statutory  provi-
sions  do  not  themselves  alter  the judicially  created  doctrines  that
identify who has standing to sue;  rather, they supplement those  doc-
trines.  In functional  terms, the statutory provisions  identify a subset
of particularly  important  circumstances  that, in  Congress's  view,  re-
quire  even  more  prompt  resolution  than  would  otherwise  occur
ns  Although the U.S. law of standing has functionalist  elements, it also has a formalist aspect.
Functionalist considerations  might undermine  the Court's  assertion in Raines about the func-
tional effects of denying legislator standing, but they are irrelevant to the Court's formalist con-
cerns.
14  See Reno v. American  Civil Liberties Union,  117 S.  Ct. 2329, 2339  (1997)  (noting that en-
forcement of the act was enjoined one week after the statute was enacted).
I  See, e.g., United States v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford R.R.  Co., 275 F.2d 525, 556
(2d. Cir.  1959)  (noting that the  need for prompt review arises from  the very nature of an  in-
junction); Thomas v. Fiedler, 700 F. Supp. 1527,  1536-37  (E.D.  Wis.  1988)  (declaring that op-
portunities for review within an administrative proceeding were insufficient).
116 See,  e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496  U.S.  310,  313  (1990)  (involving  expedited review
pursuant to statutory requirement under the Flag Protection Act of 1989); see also Reno v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. at 2339  ("[A]  three-judge District Court was convened  pursu-
ant to...  the Act.").
Sometimes the statutes respect judicial prerogatives by urging  the courts to expedite  the
cases rather  than mandating that they do so.  As far as I am aware, the U.S. Supreme Court has
expedited  review in every case  involving such  a statute, as well  as  in some others where  expe-
dited review was plainly appropriate, such as where  Congress limited  the Supreme  Court's ju-
risdiction to review cases brought under the act.  See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 517 U.S. 1182,  1183
(1996)  (granting expedited  review of Congressional limitation  of Supreme Court's jurisdiction
to review cases under Tide I of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
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through the judicially developed  mechanisms  of reasonably  prompt
review.
Legislator standing might not be functionally necessary in light of
these alternative  mechanisms for securing prompt judicial  review  of
statutory innovations; perhaps, in functionalist terms, the French and
German  systems  have legislator standing  because  they  do  not have
the alternative  of pre-enforcement  or  immediate  post-enforcement
review.
1
1
7  The Supreme Court decided on the line item veto's consti-
tutionality within a year anyway, after only one round of vetoes.  That
delay may not be substantial enough to pose the problems functional-
ists might suggest would arise  in the  absence  of reasonably  prompt
judicial review of important innovations that have constitutional over-
tones.  There are reasons to think that constitutional systems would
be  better off if they delayed judicial  review  of controversial  legisla-
tion.  The prospect of prompt judicial review may induce  legislators
to ignore serious constitutional  questions about the laws they enact.0 9
At  times,  legislators  have  strong  incentives  to  avoid  constitutional
17 The small role of  abstract review in Germany as compared to France might be understood
as the result of the availability of the concrete revimv which is available  in Germany but not in
France.
118  Functional  considerations  might, however, support  the  Court's  decision  to treat  provi-
sions for expedited review generously.  The line item veto case returned  to the Supreme Court
after President Clinton exercised  the power it purported to give him,  to eliminate  a provision
that relieved New York City of a liability that federal authorities had announced they would im-
pose on the City.  See Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. CL 2091, No. 97-1374,  1998 U.S. LEXIS
4215 (1998).  Everyone agreed that the President's actions caused an Article  III injury, but the
government contended that the City could not invoke  the expedited  rcview  provision,  which
referred to  individuals. See i&L  at *22.  The government argued  that federal  law generally uses
the term person when it refers  to a class  including both natural persons  and corporate entities
like NewYork City.  So, it argued, Congress's use of the less common temi indihadualshould  be
interpreted to refer to natural persons  only.  The City might have Article  Ill standing, but the
Court would then lackjurisdiction  to consider the City's appeal under the special statutory pro-
visions; it could invoke only whatever other statutory  mechanisms there were  for securing  Su-
preme Court consideration of its appeal.  See id. Disagreeing, Justice Stevens %ote  that the ex-
pedited review provisions "evidences  an unmistakable  Congressional  interest in a prompt and
authoritative judicial determination" of the Act's  constitutionality.  Ser id. at 023.  lWith  that
purpose in mind, the Court could find "no plausible reason" for making expedited  re-iew avail-
able to natural persons but not to corporate entities in a similar position.  See id. Justice Scalia,
in contrast, thought that the Court's interpretation  of the provision  was  inconsistent  %ith  the
ordinary meaning  of the term "individual."  Ld.  at *111-112  (Scalia, J., concurring  in part and
dissenting in part).  He noted that "it may be unlikely that this is what Congress actually had in
mind, but it is what Congress said, it is not so absurd as to be an obvious mistake, and it is there-
fore  the law."  I.  at *112.  But, "in light of the public importance of the issues involved,"  he
would have treated  the purported  appeal  as a petition for certiorari  before judgment in  the
Court of Appeals, and granted the petition.  See ihL at *113.  From  a functionalist point of view,
the key would be the bottom  line - the availability  of some means of prompt judicial review.
Means to that end were available under both the majority's andJustice Scalia's anal)ses.
19  See ALEC  STONE,  THE  BIrH  OF JUDICIAL  PoLmcs  '.  F  :.cE:  TE CoxNsTTUno.cl.
CouNciL IN CoMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE  119-20  (1992)  (discussing the political use of review by
legislators  in France);  Mark Tushnet, Polio,  Distotion and Drocratit  Ddnitaoin:  Comparati'e  It
lumination  of the CountermoritarianDifficud);  94 MICH.  L  RE%,. 245, 248-9  (1995)  (discussing the
degree to which policy distortion arises from more-than-minimal judicial rview).
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questions, such  as when the statutes raise questions that divide  politi-
cal parties from within. 2 0  The Line-Item Veto Act, however, and the
few additional examples we have from  U.S. practice,  suggest that this
concern  may be overstated  with  respect  to  situations  in  which  Con-
gress must expressly focus on whether to authorize suit.
12 1  Congress's
deliberations about enacting the legislation were pervaded  by discus-
sions of the proposal's constitutionality, discussions  that were  at least
as  well-informed  as  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  invalidating  the
Act.1 22  Against this, one must place  concerns  about the unit of com-
parison:  the  effects  of legislator standing may differ  in systems with
centralized  rather  than dispersed judicial  review,  in those  with  and
without a well-organized  public interest bar,  and in  those  with par-
liamentary  rather  than  divided  powers  political  systems.  Although
the possibility  of successful borrowing  may be dependent  on who is
evaluating the factors  that lead to  potential  success,  those  in a posi-
tion to evaluate such a possibility ordinarily will have a well-developed
understanding  of the  overall U.S.  constitutional  culture.  Such  per-
sons  will  have  a reasonably sound background  with  which  to  deter-
mine whether  a particular institution  or  a whole  module  could  be
profitably imported.
A functionalist  analysis  of comparative  experience  with  legislator
standing allows us to draw some modest conclusions.  The functional
arguments  against  legislator  standing  appear  to  be  weak,  but  the
Court's formalism may have relatively few costs when weighed against
the smooth operating of a constitutional  system facing recurrent im-
portant innovations,  especially because  the U.S. constitutional  system
has substitutes  for legislator  standing that perform  most  of its  func-
tions reasonably well. 23  Perhaps the most that can be said about the
kind  of enterprise  looking  to constitutional  experience  elsewhere  is
that it draws into question  the kinds of functional  claims  offered  by
Justice  Powell.  In a world where functionalist arguments  carry some
weight, that may amount to something.  But in a world where formal-
ist arguments are sometimes dispositive, it may not amount to much.
This  discussion  suggests  the  possibility  of reciprocal  influence
among constitutional  systems.  Under the influence of European  sys-
tems of constitutional review, the U.S. might come  to appreciate  the
120 See Mark Graber,  The Nonmajoritarian  Di[ficulty: Legislative  Deference to the Judiciary, 7  STUD.
AMi.  POL. DEv. 35, 37,  39-42  (1993)  (describing the tendency of controversial  legislation to  ex-
pand judicial power by shifting responsibility for resolving the conflict to the courts).
See,  e.g.,  Departments of Commerce, Justice,  and State Appropriations  Act, Pub. L. No.
105-119,  111 Stat. 2440, §§ 209(b),  (d)(2)  (1998)  (giving members of Congress explicit permis-
sion to sue  if aggrieved by the use of statistical  methods for  redistricting).  Note that Congress
enacted this statute after the Court's decision  in the line-item veto case.
2  See Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S.  Ct. 2091.
123 There may be cases  in which no one would have  standing unless  Congress designated  a
challenger.  Perhaps  such cases should be analyzed under the doctrinal heading  of the "politi-
cal questions" doctrine,  rather than  the "standings" doctrine.  Or, perhaps, they show that the
U.S. system has some, but relatively few, costs.
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benefits  of legislator standing  to  ensure reasonably  prompt judicial
review of statutory innovations that raise serious constitutional  ques-
tions'2 4  Drawing on the U.S. system, European  systems might come
to appreciate  the  benefits  of authorizing judicial  review  at  the  in-
stance of legislators  only in restricted circumstances, '  in  contrast to
the general authorization that exists in European systems.
The foregoing is only a sketch of the conceptual  issues associated
with the ideas of constitutional borrowing, lending, importation, and
re-importation.  The  example  of legislator  standing  is  intended  to
demonstrate how U.S.  constitutionalists  might productively  draw  on
foreign constitutional  experience and what contextual issues must be
evaluated in determining how a foreign constitutional experience will
be translated in another culture.  By necessity, much of the theorizing
about  constitutional  borrowing  is  quite  speculative.  Nonetheless,
even if the study of comparative  constitutional law proves not to have
the  kind  of reciprocal  pay-off about  constitutional  policy  that  we
might hope for, it still may be useful as part of a lawyer's  liberal edu-
cation.
126
124 It  may be that the U.S.  system of general pre-enforcement  review and  expedited review
does, in fact, offer a mechanism that satisfies the hypothesized functional requirement for rea-
sonably promptjudidal review, making a system of legislator standing unnecessary.  At the level
of democratic  theory, one might ask whether Congress or the judiciary is the  institution  that
ouht to decide which mechanism satisfies that hypothesized requirement.
One could restrict the circumstances in at least two  wa)s: 1) by some enumeration of cri-
teria under which legislator standing is appropriate;  or 2)  by the  facts of political  life, which
may lead legislators themselves to authorize  legislator standing only when  it is appropriate  ac-
cording to outside observers whose views do not have the force of law.
126 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilifies of  Comparative  Constitutional  Law Y_  LJ. (forthcoming
Apr. 1999)  (providing a more extended anal)sis of functionalism and other uscs of comparat  e
constitutional law).
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